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The FOMC in 1988:
Uncertainty’s Effects on
Monetary Policy
URING 1988, as the economy continued in
an historically long expansion, the Federal Open
Market Committee — henceforth, the “Commit-
tee” — faced the task of pursuing its long-term
objective of reasonable price stability, while pro-
moting growth in output on a sustainable basis
and improvements in the nation’s external ac-
counts.1 As the year began, the Committee
believed that accomplishing this task was com-
plicated by uncertainties associated with the
long-term effects of the stock market crash of
October 1987 and the continuing movements in
the dollar, as well as the changing relation bet-
ween the monetary aggregates and nominal out-
put. In the Committee’s view, these uncertainties,
among others, warranted a greater degree of
flexibility in the implementation of monetary
policy. Otherwise, unexpected economic de-
velopments easily could drive a wedge between
desired and actual outcomes.
To explain the challenge faced by the Commit-
tee and the role of flexibility in meeting that
challenge, this article examines the formulation
of monetary policy by the Federal Open Market
Committee in 1988. The discussion focuses on
how changing economic conditions and the
desire for greater operational flexibility influ-
enced Committee’s decisions during the year.
LON&RUN OBJECTIVES
As mandated by the Full Employment and Bal-
anced Growth Act of 1978—or equivalently, the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act—the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System reports
semiannually to Congress on the Committee’s
annual growth rate targets for monetary and
debt aggregates. In February, the Committee
establishes and reports on its objectives for the
current year; in July, the Committee reports its
progress toward achieving those objectives, its
decision to reaffirm or alter its targets for the
current year and the tentative targets for the
following year. The relevant one-year period for
the growth rate targets is from the fourth quar-
ter of the previous year to the fourth quarter
of the current year.2 Table I summarizes the
Committee’s reports to Congress on its long-run
objectives for 1988.
NOTE: Citations referred to as the “Record” are to the
“Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market
Committee” found in various issues of the Federal Reserve
Bulletin. Citations referred to as the “Report” are to the
‘Monetary Policy Report to the Congress,” also found in
various issues of the Bulletin.
‘For a description of the Committee’s membership during
1988, see the shaded insert on pages 18 and 19.
2As discussed by Hafer and Haslag (1988), among others,
such a procedure eliminates the problem of intra-year
base drift; however, it does not circumvent the inter-year
base drift problem.
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The Committee decided, as it had in the pre-
vious year, not to establish a target range for
Ml in 1988:
The behavior of this aggregate in relation to
economic activity and prices has become very sen-
sitive to changes in interest rates, among other
factois, as evidenced by sharp swings in its vel-
ocity in recent years. Consequently, the appropri-
atefless of changes in Ml this year will continue to
be evaluated in light of its velocity, developments
in the economy and financial markets, and the
nature of emerging price pressures.’
In setting its 1988 target growth ranges for
the broader monetary aggregates, M2 and M3,
at 4 to 8 percent, the Committee decided to
reduce the lower bound of the range by 1½ per-
centage points below that established for 1987.
The midpoints for the target growth ranges of
these two monetary aggregates also were re-
duced ½ percentage point below the tentative
ranges set for 1988.~ The Committee felt that
such a reduction would help to focus attention on
the need for relatively restrained expansion in
domestic demand to accommodate the adjustment
in the nation’s external accounts and would under-
score the Committee’s commitment to achieving
reasonable price stability over time.’
Because of continuing uncertainty regarding
the velocities of M2 and to a lesser extent M3,
the members agreed that widening the target
ranges for these aggregates would be appropriate:
In light of the experience of recent years, which
have been marked by large swings in velocity, the
ranges were widened somewhat. Institutional
change is a source of continuing “noise” in the
relationship of money growth to economic activity;
in addition, there clearly is a strong, systematic
sensitivity of velocity to changes in market rates
of interest.6
Moreover, the wider ranges seemed appropriate
given the increased uncertainty about the eco-
nomic outlook due to the decline in the stock
market in October 1987. The Committee noted
that “the eventual effects on domestic demand
of the October stock market plunge and the
subsequent drop in interest rates remained
unclear.”
At the time the targets were established, the
members believed that the growth in the
broader monetary aggregates would be around
the middle of the targeted ranges. Because of
the sensitivity of the M2 and M3 velocities to
movements in market interest rates and the in-
creased uncertainty about the economic out-
‘Record (May 1988), p. 323. See Hafer and Haslag (1988)
for a discussion of the Committee’s omission ofthe Ml
target. Stone and Thornton (1987) provide a critical
analysis of the existing explanations for the recent, puzzl-
ing decline in the velocity for Ml. Also, Hafer (1986)
discusses the impact that the decline in Ml velocity had
on the decisions of the FOMC in 1985.
4Report (March 1988), p. 152.
5Record (May 1988), p. 322.
~Report (March 1988), p. 152. Also, see Record (May
l98B), p. 322.
7Report (August 1988), p. 525. Also, see Record (May
1988), pp. 320-21.
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look, however, the Committee recognizedthat
outcomes consistent with the Committee’s goals
could differ. Accordingly, the Committee sought
greater leeway in targeting money growth. The
greater leeway or flexibility was afforded by the
I percentage-point increase in the width of the
targeted ranges for M2 and M3.8 Furthermore,
to assure the consistency of its actions with its
long-term objectives, the Committee felt, as in
previous years, that it would be necessary to
monitor the behavior of the broader monetary
aggregates in light of indicators of the strength
of expansion of economic activity, price pres-
sures and conditions in financial markets, in-
cluding the market for foreign exchange.9
When the Board presented the July Report to
the Congress, the broad monetary aggregates
were growing at annual rates of approximately
7 percent, close to the upper bounds of their
targeted ranges. Nevertheless, the Committee
expected that M2 growth would moderate suffi-
ciently in the second half of 1988 so that its
growth rate over the full year would fall
around the middle of its targeted range. The
lower growth rate in M2 for the second half of
the year was thought to be consistent with the
expected and desired lower growth in output
needed to achieve price stability goals. While
some members expected that Ma growth over
the full year would exceed that of MZ, they did
not expect it to exceed the upper bound of its
range. Thus, the 1988 growth rate ranges for
M2 and M3 established in February were reaf-
firmed in July 1988.10
In its July Report, the Committee provisionally
set the 1989 target ranges for M2 and MS at 3
to 7 percent and 3.5 to 7.5 percent, respective-
ly. Given the high levels of resource utilization
and the resurging fears of future inflation at
that time, a majority of the Committee agreed
that reducing the ranges for 1989 would be
consistent with the Federal Reserve System’s
goal of price stability and would communicate
the System’s intention to pursue that goal.”
8Report (August 1988), p. 525 and Record (May 1988)
p. 322. Some members were wary of such widening, as it
might signal “a further retreat from effective monetary
targeting” and partially remove a “desirable discipline” re-
quiring re-evaluation of policy if the monetary aggregates
deviated from otherwise narrower targeted ranges. See
Record (May 1988), pp. 322-23.
~Report (March 1988), pp. 152-53. Also, see Greenspan
(1988), pp. 612-13. Nuetzel (1987) discusses the Commit-
tees move to place greater weight on indicators of
economic activity and price pressures relative to the
behavior of the monetary aggregates to guide the im-
plementation of monetary policy. Also, see Heller (1988).
‘°Record(October 1988), p. 658.




Actualand Expected Money Growth in
M2 4-8% 52%
M3 4-8 6.3
‘The target period br M2 and M3 is from lVl1987 lo
1V11988.
2Dala are taken trom the Board of Governors’ H.6
release (February 23. 1989)
The Committee also reaffirmed the need to
maintain some flexibility in the general strategy
for monetary policy:
Recognizing the variability of the relationship of
these measures [MI, M2, M3 growth ratesl to the
performance of the economy, the Committee
agreed that operating decisions would continue to
be made not only in light of the behavior of the
monetary aggregates, hut also with due regard to
developments in the economy and financial mar-
kets, including attention to the sources and extent
of price pressures and to the performance of the
dollar in fot-eign exchange markets.”
Continued uncertainties about the economic
outlook and the relation between the growth in
the monetary aggregates and other key economic
variables also prompted the Committee to main-
tain the wider target ranges for M2 and M3
growth and, once again, to forego establishing a
target for Ml growth.
Table 2 shows that the actual 1988 growth
rates in M2 and M3 — 5.2 percent and 6.3 per-
cent, respectively — were within their target
ranges; however, M2 and MS growth rates fluc-
tuated considerably during the year. These fluc-
tuations influenced the Committee’s short-run
policy decisions during 1988.
SHORT-RUN POLICY OBJECTIVES
The Committee holds eight meetings during
the year to determine, in light of the economic
environment, the changes in short-run monetary
policy necessary to achieve its long-term goals.
TI’he Committee formulates a domestic policy
directive to serve as a basis for the day-to-day
policy implementation between meetings. The
directive is issued to the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York where the Manager for Domestic
Operations of the System Open Market Account
is held responsible for implementing the instruc-
tions stipulated in the directive.
Maintaining the approach used in previous
years, the directives issued during 1988 placed
primary emphasis on the degree of restraint on
reserve positions expected to be consistent with
the Committee’s money growth targets and goals
for the economy. Under the current borrowed-
reserves operating procedure, the desired degree
of reserve restraint translates into a target for
borrowed reserves (reserves borrowed from the
Federal Reserve Banks). The target level of bor-
rowed reserves (the borrowings assumption) in-
cludes adjustment plus seasonal borrowings. A
statement in the directive to increase (decrease)
the degree of pressure on reserve positions
would indicate a higher (lower) target level of
borrowed reserves. Inducing the higher (lower)
level of borrowed reserves, for a given discount
rate, would imply an increase (decrease) in the
federal funds rate.1’
In the first two directives in 1988, however,
emphasis was also placed on financial market
conditions:
In the aftermath of the stock market crash last Oc-
tober, the Committee modified the System’s pi-o-
cedures by placing greater emphasis on money
market conditions and less on bank reserve posi-
tions in carrying out day-to-day open market opera-
tions. ---During this period, it was considered im-
portant to assure the markets of the System’s in-
tention to provide adequate liquidity, and it was
feared that significant variation in money market
conditions could add to the unusual uncertainties
already in the markets.’~
At the beginning of 1988, the Committee believ-
ed that, given the fragility of financial markets
evidenced by wide fluctuations in bond and
“Report (August 1988), p. 518.
“Specifically, the amount of borrowed reserves is assumed
to be a negative function of its opportunity cost — that is,
the difference between the discount rate (the interest rate
charged for reserves borrowed from the Federal Reserve
System) and the federal funds rate (the interest rate paid
on reserves borrowed from the other depository institu-
tions). For a discussion of the implementation of monetary
policy under the borrowed-reserves operating procedures,
see Gilbert (1985), Heller (1988) and Thornton (1988).
“Report (August 1988), p. 528. See also, for example,
Record (February 1988), pp. 116-17, Record (April 1988),
p. 239, Record (May 1988), p. 324, and Record (July
1988), p. 472.
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equity prices, a policy focused primarily on
meeting reserve objectives could create exces-
sive volatility in those markets. To avoid or to
dampen temporary fluctuations in the money
markets, a policy that was flexible with respect
to meeting reserve objectives seemed appropri-
ate to the Committee.” Toward the middle of
1988, when it appeared that financial markets
had stabilized, no reference to sensitive condi-
tions in financial markets was made in the
directive.”
In addition to stating the desired degree of
reserve pressure (maintained, increased or
decreased) and possible modifications in the in-
termeeting period, the directives indicated the
expected growth rates in M2 and M3, condi-
tional on the desired degree of reserve pres-
sure, and established a range for the federal
funds rate. If the federal funds rate were to
diverge from the specified range, the chairman
could initiate a Committee consultation in the
intermeeting period.
The following discussion highlights key eco-
nomic developments during 1988 and shows
how they influenced the Committee’s formula-
tion of short-run policy objectives. Tables 3 and
4 summarize the directives issued in 1988.
Table 3 shows the desired degree of reserve
pressure, the expected growth rates of M2 and
Ma, and the monitoring range for the federal
funds rate specified in the domestic policy
directives. It also reports the borrowings as-
sumption in effect at each meeting.17 Table 4
lists the policy guides used to determine wheth-
er modifications in the degree of reserve
pressure would be desirable in the intermeeting
period. The ordering of policy guides is as listed
in the directives. Finally, table 5 shows the ac-
tual (revised) intra-year growth rates in M2 and
M3 and the rates expected by the Committee.
February 9-10 Meeting
The data available for review at the first
meeting of 1988 suggested that, although the
economy had continued to expand through the
fourth quarter of 1987, growth in output was
slowing toward the end of the year. Moreover,
because consumer spending had slowed sub-
stantially in the late months of 1987, the ob-
served growth in production was associated
chiefly with an increase in inventories. While
Committee members generally thought that in-
creased inventories could exert downward pres-
sure on business activity in the first half of
1988, some members believed such pressure
would be limited.”
The Board’s staff projected that the growth in
output over 1988 would be fueled primarily by
growth in export demand. Their projections in-
dicated that output growth would be sluggish in
the first half of the year, but would build mo-
mentum in the second half. The projected tran-
sition from an expansion driven by growth in
consumer demand to one driven by growth in
export demand generated some uncertainty
among the members about the economic out-
look. In addition, some members expressed con-
cern about the possibility of lagging effects of
the October 1987 stock market crash on con-
sumer and business spending and about the
sensitivity of financial markets.’°
The Committee’s long-run concerns centered
on the possibility of higher future inflation
because of the strong growth in demand and
the high levels of capacity utilization. Although
available economic data reflected only modest
wage increases, the Committee thought that
continued expansion with lower rates of un-
employment and rising prices inevitably would
result in higher wage demands and wage in-
creases.20 Furthermore, there was some evi-
dence that higher production costs were
resulting in higher retail prices. The members
believed that “the key to avoiding both more in-
flation or a recession in a period of major ad-
justments in the trade balance would be the dif-
15Record (May 1988), p. 324. See also footnote 14. At the
March meeting, however, some members indicated that
such fluctuations in money market interest rates were not
“detracting from the functioning of the market or the im-
plementation of policy.” Provided that market participants
understood the System’s procedures, fluctuations in
money market interest rates would reveal movements in
expectations of market participants and changes in the
market for reserves and credit. See Record (July 1988),
p. 472.
16Report (August 1988), p. 528, and Record (August 1988),
p. 542.
l7The borrowing assumptions were not explicitly stated in
the directives.
“Record (May 1988), p. 320.
l9lbid., p. 320-21
‘°lbid.,p. 322. Also, in January, growth in M2 and M3 had
recovered from the sluggish pace at the end of 1987. In
January, M2 grew at an annual rate of 8.8 percent, up
from 2.2 percent in December. Similarly, M3 grew at an
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ficult task of maintaining restrained growth in
domestic demands over an extended period.”
In an effort to strike a balance between the
risks associated with a possible weaker expan-
sion in the short run and those of future infla-
tion, the Committee’s directive called for main-
taining the degree of pressure on reserve posi-
tions.” Because of the uncertainties revolving
around financial market conditions and the
economic outlook, the directive indicated that
some flexibility in the implementation of mone-
tary policy might be appropriate. In particular,
- financial market conditions still exhibited some
degree of fragility and, against the background of
substantial uncertainty in the economic outlook,
unanticipated developments might well continue to
warrant occasional departures from the focus on
reserve objectives for the purpose of moderating
temporary fluctuations in money market condi-
tions.”
In addition, depending on financial market con-
ditions as well as forthcoming indications of
economic activity and price pressures, greater
or lesser reserve restraint would be appropriate
in the intermeeting period.’~
The Committee anticipated that the reserve
conditions would be consistent with an annual
rate of growth for M2 and M3 of about 6 to 7
percent from November to March. The monitor-
ing range for the federal funds rate was set at
4 to 8 percent.”
March 29 Meeting
In the intermeeting period, strong growth in
M2 and M3 continued.’° The level of adjustment
plus seasonal borrowings averaged $238 million,
just above the borrowings assumption, and the
federal funds rate averaged 6.59 percent during
the six-week period ending March 23.27
Economic data indicated that the economy
had continued to expand during the first quar-
ter of 1988; however, growth in output was
slower than that in the last few months in 1987.
A large part of the moderation in output
growth was attributed to the deceleration in in-
ventory investment, as businesses corrected
their previously high inventories. The ongoing
expansion was driven largely by the unex-
pected, marked increase in domestic final de-
mand in the first quarter.ZE
Although inflation and wage trends essentially
were unchanged, the Committee’s concerns
about future inflationary pressures were not
eased substantially. The February rate of un-
employment was 5.7 percent, its lowest level
since the middle of 1979. Capacity utilization
rates were relatively high in many industries. In
addition, during the intermeeting period, the
dollar had declined 2.25 percent on a trade-
weighted basis relative to the other G-10 cur-
rencies. Many argued that this decline, perhaps
reflecting a skepticism in the world market
about the speed with which the U.S. trade
deficit was adjusting, could provide an addi-
tional potential source of upward movement in
prices.’9 Moreover, the staff revised upward
their forecasts of future economic expansion.
Committee members generally felt that, with
high rates of capacity utilization in many in-
dustries, additional price pressures would be
created by increased domestic and export de-
mand growth.10
“Ibid.
‘2lbid., p. 324. There was also concern that further easing of
the degree of reserve pressure could have an adverse ef-
fect on the dollar in foreign exchange markets and on
financial markets, unless market participants believed that
the economy was weakening (Ibid.). It should be noted
that the decline in the borrowings assumption from the
December 1987 to the February 1988 meetings (as shown
in table 3) reflects reduced reserve pressure that had been




‘6ln February, M2 and M3 grew at annual rates of 8.6 and
10.1 percent, respectively, and in March, M2 and M3 grew
at annual rates of 7.8 and 8.2 percent, respectively.
27Record (July 1988), p. 469. Around the time of the
February meeting, the federal funds rate was about ~
percent. See Record (May 1988), p. 320.
2slbid p. 468-69.
2SIbid. Currencies of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and
the United Kingdom are included in the trade-weighted
0-10 index, used by the Federal Reserve Board as a
measure of the relative strength of the dollar in foreign ex-
change markets. When the value ofthe dollar falls,
holding all else constant, goods produced in the United
States become more attractive to foreign importers and in-
dividuals in the United States than goods produced else-
where. The resulting shift in demand can create domestic
price pressures. Furthermore, a dollar depreciation can in-
crease the cost of production for firms relying heavily on
imported intermediate goods, thereby creating additional
price pressures.
3elbid., p. 470-71.
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In the discussion, some Committee members sug-
gested that the effects of high capacity utilization
had not yet fully shown up in price and wage
growth because of individuals’ expectations of a
policy response to increased inflation.” Moreover,
consumer prices and wages had not yet exhibited
signs of acceleration because of the recently
declining energy prices and the relatively small in-
creases in food prices.” Nevertheless, the
members believed that any added pressure on
wages “would make achievement of the ultimate
objective of price stability considerably more dif-
ficult.”
As table 3 shows, the policy directive issued at
the close of the meeting called for a marginal in-
crease in pressure on reserve positions to slow the
growth of the broader monetary aggregates. Such
an action, reflected in the increased borrowings
assumption, was thought to be consistent with an-
nual growth rates in M2 and MS of 6 to 7 percent
for the period from March to June, a slowdown
from their rapid growth rates in the first quarter.
Given the uncertainties about the economic
outlook and concerns about the fragility of finan-
cial markets, the Committee again voted to permit
the focus of day-to-day implementation of
monetary policy to shift away from reserve objec-
tives if necessary. Furthermore, depending on for-
thcoming information as indicated in table 4,
greater or lesser reserve restraint would be accep-
table in the intermeeting period. The monitoring
range for the federal funds rate was maintained at
4 to 8 percent.’4
May 17 Meeting
Immediately following the March meeting,
some actions were taken to firm reserve posi-
tions slightly. Adjustment plus seasonal borrow-
ings averaged about $330 million during the
four-week period ending April 20 and averaged
$440 million between April 21 and May 4, Addi-
tional restraint on reserve positions was im-
plemented just before the May meeting “in light of
information that indicated considerable strength in
the economy and a related increase in concerns
about the potential for greater inflation.” By
the May meeting, the federal funds rate had
risen to 7 percent.
As had been expected, strong growth in do-
mestic and export sectors continued to boost
economic growth. Preliminary statistics sug-
gested that unemployment in April declined to
5.4 percent, its lowest rate since 1974, and
capacity utilization rates had increased substan-
tially. From March to April, the industrial pro-
duction index had risen at an annual rate of 8.4
percent; moreover, the U.S. merchandise trade
deficit had improved in March. The continued
strength in economic expansion was accom-
panied by a slight weakening of the dollar and
signs of increased inflationary pressure and
higher labor costs.36
The staff’s forecasts for the economic outlook
depended partly on how the added risks of
greater inflation and wage growth would affect
financial markets. If the added risks placed
pressures on financial markets so as to restrain
final domestic demand, “the extent and duration
of any pickup of inflation might be limited.””
The forecasts indicated that, in this case, re-
duced growth in domestic demand combined
with the current large inventories eventually
could reduce the rate of inventory investment.
Furthermore, the staff predicted that growth in
business fixed investment would fall and real
federal purchases would decline. Nevertheless,
in light of the weakening dollar and the high
capacity utilization rate, growth rates of prices
and wages were expected to increase in the
coming quarters.’8
The majority of the members generally agreed
that additional restraint was needed. In their
discussion, the risks of excessive expansion and
augmented inflationary pressures seemed to
dominate the economy’s downside risks due to
increased inventories, fragile conditions in finan-





“Record (August 1988), p. 539.
“Record (August 1988), pp. 538-39. For example, the
seasonally adjusted consumer price index for all urban
consumers had risen at annual rates of 5.3 percent in
April and 4.2 percent in March, up from 2.1 percent in
February. Further, the seasonally adjusted producer price
index for finished goods rose 4.6 percent and 3.4 percent,
respectively, in March and April, after not changing in
February. Note that the civilian unemployment rate in April




construction. In addition, the importance of
maintaining credibility was noted:
- the members generally agreed that some further
tightening of reserve conditions was needed to
counter the risks of rising inflationary pressures
in the economy. A failure to act in timely fashion
not only would be inconsistent with the Commit-
tee’s commitment to achieving price stability over
time but would in fact compound the difficulties
of accomplishing that objective.”
The Committee members disagreed, however,
about the extent and timing of additional
tightening of reserves. Immediate action was
considered by some to be potentially damaging
to financial markets unless market participants
anticipated such an action. Further, the impact
of the previous move to increase pressure had
not yet been fully realized in terms of growth
of domestic demand. Finally, growth in the
monetary aggregates was expected to slow, pri-
marily because of a reversal of the temporary
rise in transaction accounts related to taxes
during April. Yet, others thought that immediate
action could have a favorable effect on inflation
expectations and reduce the need for increased
restraint in the future.~°
The Committee’s directive called for maintain-
ing the existing pressure on reserve positions in
the initial period following the meeting with
possibly higher pressure after some weeks de-
pending on forthcoming information.~’
In contrast to prior directives since the stock
market crash in October 1987, this directive did
not explicitly include a special reference to the
sensitive conditions in the financial markets that
required some flexibility in the conduct of open
market operations. The members felt that the
“normal” approach to the implementation of
monetary policy—that is, with primary emphasis
on the degree of pressure on reserve positions
and less emphasis on money market conditions
— would be appropriate; the special reference
“no longer served a clarifying purpose in com-
municating the Committee’s intentions.”4’
The directive issued at the close of this meet-
ing, however, did not fully abandon the spirit of
flexibility; financial markets would continue to
be closely monitored. Although the primary
focus of the directive was placed on meeting re-
serve objectives, changes in those objectives
could be made in light of incoming information
in the intermeeting period. The directive stated
that, depending on further developments in the
economy, “somewhat greater reserve restraint
would, or slightly lesser reserve restraint might,
also be acceptable later in the intermeeting
period.”~’
The reserve conditions contemplated by the
Committee were expected to be consistent with
a6to 7 percent annual growth rate in M2 and
M3 from March to June. The monitoring range
for the federal funds rate was increased by 1
percentage point to 5 to 9 percent, because of
past actions to increase the pressure on reserve
positions and possible further restraint.’~
June 29-30 .Meeting
Actions were taken to increase the degree of
pressure on reserve positions as suggested by
the May directive. Adjustment plus seasonal bor-
rowings averaged $330 million in the four
weeks ending June 15. The federal funds rate
rose from 7 percent around the time of the
prior meeting to approximately 7 3/8 to 7½ per-
cent by the middle of June. Despite the addi-
tional restraint imposed on reserve positions in
the latter part of June, however, adjustment
plus seasonal borrowing averaged only about
$520 million over the two weeks ending June
29. Nonetheless, the federal funds rate rose fur-
ther to about 8 percent and, as expected by
Committee members, growth in M2 and M3 fell
from their robust pace earlier in the year.4’
From the May to the June meetings, the
strong expansion in economic activity continued.
“Ibid.
4°lbid.,pp. 540-41 -
41The increase in the borrowings assumption from the
previous meeting, as indicated in table 3, reflects actions
in the intermeeting period to increase reserve pressure
and, hence, is consistent with the stated desired degree of
reserve pressure. It should be noted that the increase in
the borrowings assumption does not reflect the expecta-
tion of additional restraint in the beginning of the inter-
meeting period.
42lbid., p. 542.
~‘Ibid.,p. 543. As indicated in table 4, although the special
reference to “sensitive” conditions in financial markets
was absent from the directive, conditions in financial
markets were first on the list of policy guides in the direc-
tive issued at the May meeting.
~~Ibid.
4mRecord (October 1988), p. 655. Annualized growth in M2
fell from 8.8 percent in April to 3.9 percent In May, and
annualized growth in M3 fell from 7.8 percent in April to
4.9 percent in May.
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While unemployment rose to 5.8 percent in
May, it was still below its average in the first
quarter. Moreover, the industrial production in-
dex grew at a relatively fast pace of 6.4 percent
from April to May. The information reviewed
by the Committee indicated that the impetus to
the current expansion was continued growth in
both domestic and export demands. Improve-
ments in the external accounts, due mostly to a
decline in imports, was accompanied by a sharp
appreciation of the dollar.” Furthermore, signs
of increased price pressures were clear. The
consumer price index was moving at a pace
close to the average in the first quarter, but
producer prices and average hourly earnings
were gaining momentum in May.4’
Staff forecasts suggested that the growth in
economic activity would be moderated by sev-
eral factors, including the impact of the drought
on agricultural output and a more pronounced
slowdown in inventory investment than was
originally expected. In addition, recent pres-
sures on financial markets — particularly, the
rise in interest rates — could restrain future
growth in domestic spending. Because of fur-
ther improvements in the U.S. trade balance,
however, the expansion was expected to con-
tinue, though at a reduced pace.4’
Concerned about the credibility of its goal to
achieve reasonable price stability, some mem-
bers suggested that maintaining the current
degree of restraint might create a signal of
easier monetary policy. Others felt that increas-
ed restraint might be excessive. In particular,
the effects of earlier actions to place greater
pressure on reserve positions had not yet fully
materialized in terms of the strength of busi-
ness expansion. Moreover, further restraint
would impose added pressure on an already
stronger dollar, supported by recent improve-
ments in the trade balance and expectations of
tight monetary policy, with adverse implications
for the needed improvement in external
balances.”
A majority of the members voted for a slightly
increased degree of pressure on reserve posi-
tions, as indicated in table 3. Additional re-
straint or ease would depend on the forthcom-
ing indications of inflationary pressures,
business expansion, future developments in the
foreign exchange and domestic financial mar-
kets and the behavior of monetary aggregates.
The reserve conditions contemplated were ex-
pected to be consistent with annual growth
rates in M2 and M3 of 5.5 percent and 7 per-
cent, respectively, from June to September. The
monitoring range for the federal funds rate was
maintained at 5 to 9 percent.’°
August 16 Meeting
Following the June meeting, as specified in
the June directive, more restrictive actions were
taken. In the first two weeks of July, average
adjustment plus seasonal borrowings surged to
$1.3 billion, reflecting a large increase in bor-
rowings over the long July 4 weekend and
other special circumstances. In the subsequent
four weeks, adjustment plus seasonal borrow-
ings fell back to around the targeted level of
$600 million, and preliminary evidence indicated
that the growth of the broader monetary ag-
gregates, especially M2, fell in July.”
During the intermeeting period, incoming data
indicated a further expansion of economic ac-
tivity and additional inflationary pressures.
Preliminary evidence suggested that the in-
dustrial production index rose at an annual rate
of 13 percent from June to July. Moreover, the
capacity utilization rate for all industries in
June was estimated to be 85.1 percent, up from
the second quarter average of 82.9 percent.”
The seasonally adjusted producer price index
for finished goods had increased at an annual
rate of 6.9 percent from June to July. The
federal funds rate had risen recently from its
average rate in June — from around 7¾ per-
cent to 7 7/8 percent — and on August 9, the
“Ibid., pp. 654-55. Since the last meeting, the dollar had
appreciated 6 percent on a weighted average basis in rela-





“Record (November 1988), p. 755. Revised annual growth
rates in M2 were 5.5 and 4.4 percent, respectively, for
June and July, and M3 grew at annual rates of 6.8 and
7.3 percent respectively for June and July.
“The estimate for the annual growth rate in the industrial
production index from June to July has been revised to 14
percent. Also, the estimated capacity utilization rate for
total industry during June has been revised to 83 percent.
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Board increased the discount rate from 6 per-
cent to 6.5 percent.”
By the August meeting, the expansion in
economic activity appeared to have strengthen-
ed, with indications of accelerating prices and
labor costs. Total nonfarm payroll employment
rose sharply in June and July, and the
unemployment rate in July was below the
second-quarter average. While the consumer
price index had not risen substantially, chiefly
because of declining oil prices, recent move-
ments in the producer price index were indica-
tive of accelerating prices. The dollar had risen
2.5 percent compared with the other G-10 cur-
rencies since the June meeting, reflecting fur-
ther improvement in the trade balance and the
recent tightening of reserve conditions.’~
Other effects of the previous tightening were
starting to emerge. In particular, the expansion
of the monetary aggregates had exhibited a
marked deceleration in recent months, and in-
terest rates had risen 50 to 75 basis points since
the June meeting. The staff continued to expect
pressures in financial markets to restrain do-
mestic spending. Despite the appreciation of the
dollar, the staff expected continued improve-
ments in the nation’s trade balance to be the
driving force to further economic expansion.
The relatively high rates of capacity utilization
were perceived to point to increased infla-
tionary pressures.”
‘the members agreed that, given the recent
rise in the discount rate, it would be appropri-
ate to maintain the current degree of pressure
on reserve conditions. While many members
felt that further tightening of reserve conditions
might well be needed, others thought that
previous moves to tighten might prove to be
sufficient. Some members argued that increased
pressure could induce an excessive, upward
movement in the dollar and thereby inhibit fur-
ther improvement in the external balance. Some
also expressed concerns that an increase in in-
terest rates could have adverse effects on debt-
ors and troubled financial intermediaries.
Others pointed out that increased inflationary
pressures would have a similar effect by foster-
ing even higher nominal interest rates.”
As reported in table 3, the directive adopted
by the Committee called for maintaining the
current reserve conditions, although greater or
lesser restraint might be appropriate in the in-
termeeting period, depending on the behavior
of prices and economic indicators. The reserve
conditions contemplated by the Committee were
expected to be consistent with annual growth
rates of approximately 3.5 and 5.5 percent,
respectively, for M2 and M3 from June to Sep-
tember. In light of the recent increase in the
discount rate, the directive increased the federal
funds monitoring range to 6 to 10 percent.’7
September 20 Meeting
Reserve conditions hardly changed in the in-
termeeting period. ‘the federal funds rate aver-
aged about 8 1/8 percent over the period, close
to the level prevailing at the time of the August
meeting, and the growth of the monetary ag-
gregates continued to decline.”
Information available for review at the
September meeting suggested a slight modera-
tion in expansion of economic activity from the
intense pace earlier in the year. The moderation
was especially evident in labor markets; al-
though there were substantial gains in nonfarm
payroll employment in July and August, the
pace of growth had slowed, and the unemploy-
ment rate rose to 5.6 percent in August. Simi-
larly, capacity utilization rates remained
generally high, but rates in manufacturing
edged lower. Further, gains in industrial pro-
duction in August were much smaller than they
had been in previous months.”
Recent developments in domestic spending
also suggested that the pace of economic expan-
“By the August meeting, the federal funds rate was approx-





“Ibid., pp. 758-59. An increase in the discount rate without
a change in the borrowings assumption is a restrictive
policy. To maintain the borrowings assumption with a
given increase in the discount rate that initially reduces
the level of borrowed reserves, the Federal Reserve must
remove nonborrowed reserves from the economy until the
federal funds rate increases enough to restore the level of
borrowed reserves back to its assumed level.
“Record (January 1989), p. 21. M2 grew at an annual rate
of 2.3 percent in August, while M3 grew at an annual rate
of 4.6 percent over the same period.
“Ibid., p. 20.
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sion was slowing. Growth in sales of nondur-
able goods was sluggish and the level of sales of
durables had fallen in July and August. In addi-
tion, the U.S. merchandise trade deficit had
dropped substantially in July, primarily because
of a reduction in imports. The weakening of the
dollar earlier in the intermeeting period, at-
tributed to reports of soft employment condi-
tions, was virtually offset by the strengthening
of the dollar due to the trade reports.’°
Despite evidence that economic growth was
slowing from its pace in the summer, price
pressures persisted. While the seasonally ad-
justed producer price index of finished goods
increased at an annual rate of 3.4 percent in
August, down from a 6.9 percent increase in Ju-
ly, the seasonally adjusted consumer price index
for all urban consumers increased at an annual
rate of 5.2 percent in July, up from 4.1 percent
in August and 4.2 percent in June. Increased
price pressures were perceived to be driven by
the substantial increases in food prices resulting
from the summer drought and increasing
gasoline prices.”
In their discussion of objectives for short-run
policy, the members took into account the re-
cent moderation in monetary growth. (Table 5
shows the deceleration in the expansion of M2
and MS from June to September.) In the view
of at least some members, this moderation
would tend to restrain future domestic spend-
ing, thereby reinforcing the recent slowdown of
the economic expansion. Although some mem-
bers felt that previous actions to tighten might
prove to be sufficient to achieve expansion in
economic activity consist with reasonable price
stability, many remained concerned that the
risks of inflation might intensify:
Some favorable developments that had tended to
dampen inflation, such as declining oil prices and
a rising dollar, might well be reversed. More fun-
damentally, given current utilization rates of labor
and other production resources, the economy was
probably near the point where expansion at a rate
somewhat above the economy’s trend growth po-
tential could jesult in greater pressures on wages
and prices.”
Some members, pointing to recent movements
in expectations of inflation as revealed in finan-
cial markets, especially for long-term debt, saw
a greater possibility that the economy might be
on a less-inflationary course.”
The Committee’s directive called for an un-
changed degree of pressure on reserve condi-
tions until more information, suggesting the
desirability of an alternative policy action, be-
came available. (See tables 3 and 4.) Those
believing that inflation could intensify were will-
ing to wait for additional evidence. The pre-
vious restrictive policy actions might have been
sufficient to avoid additional inflation. Further
tightening could have a disruptive impact on
financial markets and an unwanted effect on
the dollar that could hamper or even reverse
improvements in the U.S. external balances.
The Committee was prepared to take the
measures needed to carry out its anti-infla-
tionary commitment. In particular, all members
agreed to adopt a
- - directive that would more readily accom-
modate a move toward firming than an adjust-
ment toward easing in the weeks ahead. Some
commented that near-term developments were not
likely to call for a policy change in this period,
while others saw a greater likelihood that inter-
meeting developments would point to the desir-
ability of some firming. The potential need for
some easing was viewed as remote.’4
The members expected that the contemplated
reserve conditions would be consistent with an-
nual growth rates of 3 percent and 5 percent,
respectively, for M2 and MS over the period
from August to December. The monitoring
range for the federal funds rate was maintained
at 6 to 10 percent.”
November 1 Meeting
Between the September and November meet-
ings, adjustments plus seasonal borrowings
averaged about $630 million, just above the bor-
rowings assumption, and the average federal
funds rate rose to about 8¼ percent. Growth in
the monetary aggregates continued to fall in
September; preliminary data indicated that M2
growth had been particularly weak in October.”
“Ibid., pp. 20-21. “Ibid
“Record (February 1989), p. 67. Revised statistics indicate
that M2 grew at annual rates of 2.1 and 2.9 percent,
respectively, in September and October. The annualized
growth rate for M3 increased from 3.6 percent in






Reinforcing the evidence from the previous
meeting, the data available at the November
meeting revealed a moderation in the expansion
of economic activity. Although the civilian
unemployment rate fell to 5.4 percent in
September, third-quarter growth in total non-
farm payroll employment fell from its pace in
the first half of the year. Preliminary evidence
showed that industrial capacity utilization fell
slightly in September, but the rate was still
relatively high, and the pace of growth in in-
dustrial production slowed from its fast pace in
the summer months. Moreover, private domes-
tic final demand exhibited substantially slower
growth in the third quarter than it had in the
first half of the year.”
The Committee welcomed evidence of a
slowdown in economic growth; however, the
evidence did not mitigate its concern about the
risks of greater inflationary pressures in the
future. At the producer and consumer levels,
inflation had declined slightly in September
relative to August, because of falling energy
prices, and wage increases were modest. But,
the third-quarter average rates of growth in the
consumer and producer price indexes exceeded
their respective average growth rates for the
first half of 1988.” Furthermore, the dollar had
depreciated significantly relative to the other
G-1O currencies since the August meeting.”
Forecasts by the staff suggested that “any
decline in inflation would be limited, largely
because of continuing pressures stemming from
still strong demands pressing against reduced
margins of unutilized labor and other produc-
tion resources.”7’ The majority of the members
expected that the economic expansion would
continue at a more moderate pace in the com-
ing months “partly in light of the monetary
policy tightening that already had been imple-
mented this year.” Additional improvements in
the trade balance and increases in inventory in-
vestments were expected to contribute to con-
tinuing economic growth.
Despite the Committee’s concern about future
inflationary pressures, a majority of the mem-
bers believed that the “current relatively bal-
anced performance of the economy and the
uncertainties surrounding the outlook argued
for an unchanged policy at this point.” As
table 3 indicates, the directive called for main-
taining the current degree of pressure in
reserve positions. However, most of the mem-
bers believed that policy implementation should
continue to be especially alert to possible
economic developments that could warrant
some firming in the intermeeting period. Placing
additional or less pressure on reserve positions
might be acceptable depending on developments
in the intermeeting period. (See table 4.) Most of
the members anticipated that additional re-
straint would be warranted in the intermeeting
period.” The reserve conditions contemplated
were expected to be consistent with annual
growth rates of 2½ percent and 6 percent,
respectively for M2 and M3 from September to
December.’~
December 13-14 Meeting
In the several weeks after the November
meeting, it became apparent that the relation
between borrowed reserves and the federal
funds rate had changed. The demand for bor-
rowed reserves seemed to shift back so that a
given level of borrowed reserves was associated
with a higher federal funds rate. To accom-
modate the shift, the borrowings assumption
was reduced, thereby putting downward pres-
sure on the federal funds rate. Because incom-
ing information indicated that the strength of
economic expansion was greater than expected
and contained greater potential for inflation
than desired by the Committee, the accommoda-
tion was only partial; therefore, the adjusted
“Ibid., p. 66.
“Ibid., pp. 66-67. For example, in the third quarter, annual
growth in the seasonally adjusted consumer price index
rose to 4.7 percent, up from 3.7 percent in the first quarter
and 4.5 percent in the second quarter.
“Ibid., p. 67. Between August and October, the dollar had
depreciated 3.25 percent on a trade-weighted basis in rela-




“Ibid., p. 69-70. Such a “bias” toward potential restraint
appears to have been partly driven by what the Committee
perceived as a “continuing need to sustain the System’s
commitment to its long-run objective of controlling inflation,
including the desirability of making clear that the current
rate of inflation was unacceptable.” See Record (February
1989), p. 69.
‘4lbid., p. 70.
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borrowings assumption was expected to be con-
sistent with a slightly higher federal funds rate.
The average rate at which federal funds traded
over the intermeeting period rose from around
8¼ percent to 8½ percent. In general, rates in
short-term credit markets and, to a lesser ex-
tent, those in long-term credit markets, rose
over the intermeeting period. Growth in the
broader monetary aggregates exceeded the
Committee’s expectations.”
The information reviewed at the December
meeting pointed to a rapid economic expansion,
once the effects of the drought were removed.
The strength of the expansion appeared greater
than what the Committee had perceived it to be
at the previous meeting. Although the unem-
ployment rate rose from 5.3 percent in October
to 5.4 percent in November, total nonfarm
payroll employment made large gains in those
two months, Preliminary evidence indicated that
the industrial production index rose sharply
over the intermeeting period and capacity
utilization rates for November were relatively
high by recent standards.~’Further, while
growth in overall consumer spending appeared
to moderate, total retail sales increased marked-
ly over the intermeeting period.”
There was no clear evidence that the general
price level was accelerating. But the greater-
than-expected economic expansion, accompanied
by signs of accelerating labor costs as well as a
xveakening of the dollar in foreign exchange
markets, increased the Committee’s concerns
about future inflation.” Most members believed
that, without additional restrictive policy ac-
tions, potential growth in economic activity in
1989 would not be consistent with avoiding
higher inflation in the future because of the
already high rates of resource utilization:
- in the absence of a timely move to restraint,
greater inflation would become embedded in the
economy, especially in the labor-cost structure. A
new wage-price spiral would then be very difficult
to avoid and the critical task of bt’inging inflation
under control would be prolonged and much
more disruptive.”
The risks of greater inflation would be augmen-
ted if the dollar fell substantially from its cur-
rent level.
Many members believed that, if the inflation
condition were allowed to worsen, rising inter-
est rates due to greater inflationary expectations
eventually could lead to a downturn in the
economy. Other members were more concerned
about the downside risks associated with addi-
tional restrictive actions:
In addition to job and output losses, a recession
could impede progress in bringing the federal
budget into balance and could have severe reper-
cussions on the viability of highly leveraged bor-
rowers and many depository institutions.”
In general, the members perceived that risks of
greater inflation in the future would pose a
greater threat to future growth in economic ac-
tivity than would a slightly more restrictive
policy.”
The uncertainties about the impact of further
monetary restraint generated some disagree-
ment among the members about the exact tim-
ing and degree of additional restraint. On the
one hand, a gradual restraining policy would
“Ibid., p. 71, and Record (Federal Reserve Press Release,
February 10, 1989), p. 4. M2 grew at an annual rate of 6.9
percent and M3 grew at an annual rate of 6.6 percent in
November. At the December meeting, the Committee
reviewed the procedures for the implementation of
monetary policy, in light of the recent unusual behavior of
the relation between borrowings and the federal funds
rate. In the several weeks prior to the meeting, once the
fundamental change in that relationship had been iden-
tified, day-to-day policy actions were carried out with some
flexibility. Some members suggested that a move to place
more emphasis on the federal funds rate relative to the
degree of pressure on reserve positions might be ap-
propriate since the unusual behavior of the relationship be-
tween the federal funds rate and borrowing could con-
tinue. Because of the perceived advantages of the current-
ly used operating procedure, however, it was decided that
no changes in the procedures for policy implementation
would be made, although “flexibility would remain impor-
tant in accomplishing Committee objectives under chang-
ing circumstances.” IRecord (Federal Reserve Press
Release, February 10, 1989), pp. 15-16]
“Record (Federal Reserve Press Release February 10,
1989), pp. 1-2. The capacity utilization rates for the total
industry rose from 83.7 percent in September to 84.0 per-
cent and 84.1 percent, respectively, in October and
November. The industrial production index rose at an an-
nual rate of 7.2 percent in October and 4.4 percent in
November, up from 0.9 percent annual rate of growth in
September.
“Ibid., pp. 2-3. Total retail sales rose at annual rates of 20.1
percent and 15.7 percent, respectively, in October and
November, after having declined at an annual rate of 2.6
percent in September.
“Ibid., pp. 6-8. Over the intermeeting period, the dollar’s






minimize the possible disruptive effects in dom-
estic and international financial markets; im-
mediate action could lead to an escalation of in-
terest rates in world markets, with especially
damaging consequences for less-developed debt-
or nations. Moreover, sharp tightening could im-
pose excessive restraint on the growth of the
monetary aggregates and, ultimately, on the
growth of economic activity. On the other hand,
it was thought that immediate tightening could
contain perceived increased price pressures and
inflationary expectations more effectively. With-
out some tightening, growth in M2 and M3
could accelerate.”
The directive called for an immediate slight
increase in the degree of pressure on reserve
conditions, as shown in table 3. Further tighten-
ing actions would be implemented at the begin-
ning of 1989 unless economic and financial con-
ditions were to deviate substantially from the
Committee’s expectations (see table 4). Given the
reserve conditions contemplated by the Commit-
tee, growth in M2 and M3 were expected to be
3 percent and 6½ percent, respectively, from
November 1988 to March 1989. Because of the
restrictive policy actions specified in the direc-
tive and those expected to be implemented in
the intermeeting period, the monitoring range
for the federal funds rate was raised to 7t o11
percent.”
CONCLUSION
The Committee’s uncertainty about the econ-
omic outlook motivated it to adopt a more flexi-
ble strategy for the implementation of monetary
policy in 1988. This additional flexibility mani-
fested itself in long-run goals for money growth
and in short-run policy implementation. The
changing economic environment played an im-
portant role in the evolution of policy in 1988
in terms of the changing emphasis toward mon-
etary restraint.
At the beginning of the year, the Committee
believed that sharp fluctuations in money
market interest rates should be resisted. In ad-
dition, it was concerned that economic growth
could slow substantially. Consequently, the Com-
mittee placed greater weight early in the year
on conditions in financial markets in the im-
plementation of policy, though the latter also
would continue to be guided by the behavior of
the monetary aggregates, price pressures and
other indications of economic activity. The addi-
tional flexibility permitted temporary departures
from reserve objectives to avoid unusual fluc-
tuations in money market interest rates.
As the year progressed, it became increasingly
apparent to the Committee that financial mar-
kets were sufficiently stabilized and that the
stock market collapse in the previous year
would not have a devastating effect on aggre-
gate economic activity. Accordingly, the Com-
mittee abandoned some of the additional flex-
ibility it had sought since October 1987, and
returned to its earlier practice of placing pri-
mary emphasis on reserve positions. At the
same time, incoming information heightened the
Committee’s concerns about future inflation.
Specifically, the strength of the economic expan-
sion was perceived to be incompatible with the
Committee’s long-term goal of reasonable price
stability. In response to the increased risks of
future price pressures, the Committee moved
toward a more restrictive monetary policy star-
ting in late March.
In the second half of the year, when the in-
creased risks of future price pressures came to
the forefront of the Committee’s concerns, the
uncertainty stemming from the dollar’s move-
ments and the impact of previously implemen-
ted restrictive monetary policy on the economy
were given increased emphasis in the Commit-
tee’s deliberations. As the dollar gained notable
strength against other major currencies in the
summer and there were some indications of a
moderating economic expansion, no changes in
the degree of pressure on reserve positions
were made. When the dollar started to decline
in foreign exchange markets, there was also in-
creasing evidence that the economic expansion
was more in line with the Committee’s goal of
price stability and again, no policy changes
“Ibid., pp. 10-lI. The members also discussed the implica-
tions for the tightening of reserve positions combined with
an increase in the discount rate. Despitethe fact that a
rise in the discount rate could communicate the Commit-
tee’s commitment to fight inflation, an increase in the dis-
count rate was not seen as an appropriate policy action at
that time by most members. Like a sharp, immediate in-
crease in the degree of pressure on reserve positions, an
increase in the discount rate could disrupt domestic and
international financial markets. Nevertheless, the Commit-
tee did not rule out the possibility during the intermeeting
period and agreed to call a special consultation in the
event that the Board of Governors agreed to increase the
discount rate (Ibid., p. 11.).
“Ibid., pp. 13-15.
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